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LETTER DATED 6 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 6 June 1994 from the Director General of the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Mr. Hans Blix, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Letter dated 6 June 1994 from the Director General of the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea addressed to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of IAEA

I very much regret that you came to a "hasty conclusion" that IAEA could not provide assurance about the non-diversion of nuclear material, alleging that the technical possibility for later measurement of core fuel rods would be lost at the five-megawatt experimental nuclear power plant.

We agreed, a few days ago, to the proposal of the Agency's Deputy Director General on the consultation by exchange of telexes in respect of the refuelling campaign, and requested the Agency to provide us with a scientific and technical response to the manner proposed by us, which preserved the technical possibility for later measurement of fuel rods.

Nevertheless, you have not yet answered our proposal and you have transmitted to the Security Council an unreasonable report in which facts were misrepresented, speaking ill of us as if we had not yet replied to the Agency's letter (S/1994/656, annex).

Moreover, what we cannot but make an issue of is the fact that you have ignored our unique status based on the suspension of our withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

This, our unique status, has been created and recognized by the United States of America and IAEA. For these reasons, they agreed to the inspection for the continuity of safeguards knowledge, and so far the Agency has conducted not the routine and ad hoc inspection under the Safeguards Agreement, but the inspection for the continuity of safeguards knowledge.

At present, the refuelling campaign, too, is conducted in the presence of IAEA inspectors and under IAEA surveillance and containment on the basis of the above-mentioned principles. The IAEA inspectors, who are present during the refuelling, have also recognized that there is no diversion of nuclear material from the reactor. Speaking of the verification of the core history alleged by the Agency, the matter will be resolved automatically if our unique status is removed. At present, we are conducting the refuelling campaign in a manner that preserves the technical possibility for later measurement of fuel rods, on the assumption that our unique status will be removed. The fuel discharge operation has been carried out channel by channel, channel group by channel group in sequence, and 40 rods from 4 channels have been discharged into one basket. All the operations of core discharge, including the identification numbers of baskets and channels, sequence of rods in a channel and the position of baskets in the spent fuel pond, have been kept on the accounting and operating records by operators and confirmed by the IAEA inspectors every day. This shows that the refuelling operation is conducted in a manner that preserves the possibility to reconstruct the channels of fuel rods and the sequence of rods in the channel, if necessary. The adequacy of the manner to preserve the technical

possibility for later measurement has been proven not only theoretically but also experimentally.

This is the only rational method suitable to our unique status. All the facts show that the Agency can verify whether the nuclear material from the reactor has been diverted in the past, at the time when our unique status is removed.

Nevertheless, it was stated in your reports to the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council that "any future measurement of that fuel would have no practical value because they would have to be based on operators' records which are unverifiable and also because it would not be possible to reconstruct the configuration of fuel rods in the core". This shows that you seem to have no interest in a fair solution of our "nuclear issue", in keeping with your predetermined prejudiced political view.

Our practical experience from past Agency inspections shows that the more we accept IAEA inspections with our maximum goodwill and generosity, the more artificial obstacles the Agency makes to the solution of our issue, leading us to a serious situation, in attaching an unreasonable condition to us every time.

We made our position clear during the Board meeting in February 1993 that the inconsistencies could be clarified if the Agency verified the fuel rods from the core during the refuelling campaign. However, at that time, the IAEA secretariat objected to our proposal, alleging that the inconsistencies could not be resolved in such a manner and making the Board adopt the resolution concerning a "special inspection of two ordinary military sites".

After the inspection last March, the IAEA secretariat transmitted to the Security Council the matter of the "non-completed inspection activities", alleging, upon the return to Vienna by the Agency inspection team that had completed the activities for the continuity of safeguards knowledge, that it was indispensable for the Agency to take smears from the plutonium glove box area and perform gamma mapping in building 3 at the radiochemical laboratory in order to verify non-diversion of nuclear material.

When we permitted the Agency to conduct "non-completed inspection activities" as a special exception, the Agency this time said to us that it was indispensable to measure the fuel rods from the core, which was a matter already denied by the Agency in the past.

On one hand, the Agency inspection team cancelled the agreement on the archive samples for clarification of the inconsistencies during the past inspection, and, on the other hand, said that it was indispensable for the Agency to make "special inspection of two ordinary military sites" to verify non-diversion of nuclear material.

This shows that the IAEA secretariat continues to join the United States of America in their hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to make our ordinary military sites open one by one under the pretext of the inspection.

The current development of the refuelling campaign bears resemblance to the IAEA's pressure campaign in the beginning of 1993 when the Agency cooked up non-existent "inconsistencies" on the basis of false intelligence information provided by a third party and imposed on us the so-called "special inspection of two ordinary military sites" on the basis of the "inconsistencies".

I think such unreasonable acts of the IAEA are unprecedented events in the history of safeguards. I would like to remind you that, for these reasons, we could not but have withdrawn from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons last year.

In the light of the above, we cannot but doubt whether our nuclear issue can, indeed, be resolved through further consultations with the IAEA.

Recently, the IAEA secretariat has made obstacles to our normal nuclear activities concerning the refuelling operation at the beginning of the campaign, intentionally avoiding the presence of the IAEA inspection team. On the other hand, at present, they have made another obstacle to a smooth solution of our nuclear issue by making a hasty conclusion that the Agency could not provide assurance about the non-diversion of nuclear material. All this is very irresponsible and hasty behaviour wherein objective reality has been intentionally misrepresented. Accordingly, the IAEA secretariat will have to bear the full responsibility for all the consequences arising from such wrong conclusions and unreasonable behaviour.

If the IAEA secretariat transmits our nuclear issue to the Security Council and continues to resort to pressure only on the basis of the "hasty conclusion" that the technical possibility for later measurement of the fuel rods has been lost, widening its unfairness and partiality, we will not feel any longer that we are subject to the unreasonable binding of the IAEA secretariat, and we cannot but go on to the next process in our peaceful nuclear activities.

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